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Never make predictions, especially
about the future.
But in civil commitments, courts predict
future behavior all the time. Judicial action
here has severe results for the individual:
deprivation of liberty, potentially unwanted
and intrusive treatment, and the stigma of
mental illness. Judicial inaction can also do
harm: erroneous release can lead to injury
of the person or others. Resolving these
risks requires courts to find the person
poses a danger to him/herself or others
because of a mental illness.
The opinions of experts in prediction
should help these courts, but over 30 years
of scientific and judicial opinion argue that
predictions of danger do little better than
chance or lay speculation. Even the best
predictions leave substantial room for error
about individual cases.
One would expect the rules of expert evidence, especially the reliability standards of
Daubert, to require the exclusion of predictive expertise from the civil commitment
process.1 Daubert displaced the Frye standard2, replacing it with a test focused in
part on scientific reliability. To be sure, federal evidence law does not bind the states:
some follow Daubert, some Frye and some
(like Georgia) follow their own path. But
the test should not matter. Given the notorious unreliability of prediction, and deep
division in the professional community, we
would expect no court to admit predictive
opinions under Daubert, Frye or any evidentiary standard.
Yet, no appellate court has ever ordered
exclusion of expert psychiatric testimony
about danger in a civil commitment case.
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To the contrary, courts welcome these opinions, and do so with their eyes open: judicial opinions regularly refer to, and explicitly accept, the imperfections of predictive
testimony. What is going on? How can
such unreliable opinion survive Daubert’s
stress on scientific reliability?
The answer is simple: Daubert requires
more than scientific reliability. It also
requires assessing how the expertise "fits"
the demands of the case. Even without validation, a court may still use an opinion if it
has a sufficiently strong fit to fact-finding.
The example of predictive expertise helps
both to develop a methodology for assessing
fit and to find factors for determining fit.
The methodology appraises civil commitment as a case type: its substantive and constitutional dimensions; its burdens of proof;
the characteristic patterns of proving danger, including expert testimony; and the
legal definition for a finding of danger. The
resulting factors for assessing fit include:
how thoroughly the substantive law of the
case has absorbed concerns over the reliability of a given expertise in shaping the case
process; the prevalence of the particular
experts as witnesses in the case; the inherent
difficulty of fact-finding on the issue and
the extent to which the expertise eases that
difficulty; and the similarity of the inferential process embodied in the opinion to
those required for fact-finding. These factors explain why courts have so readily
accepted the deep uncertainties of predictive testimony.
The argument thus suggests a revised model
for assessing expertise, which reframes
Daubert from a test of reliability to an
assessment of the demands of judicial factfinding. The model assumes courts will find
ways to admit even risky opinions in a given
case, when the fit is strong enough. The
model matters in at least three distinct ways:
• For mental health law, the model allows us
to conclude that courts have consistently
gotten it right about predictive testimony.

It thus aligns current doctrine with
decades of consistent judicial opinion.
Predictive testimony should be admissible
in civil commitment cases under Daubert.
• The model raises useful questions for evidence scholars. With predictive expertise,
the twin concerns of reliability and fit act
in inverse proportion. The strength of the
fit overcomes weaknesses in the reliability
of predictive testimony. But that may not
work in all cases, and may in fact reflect
features unique to predictive testimony in
civil commitments. The contextual
methodology described above can guide
future research about the limits of expert
evidence in other areas.
• The model has practical consequences for
federal courts and for states that have
adopted Daubert. Trial judges can assess
not only the standard of rigor experts in a
field might require, but also the fit to
which that standard bears to the rigor of
fact-finding on difficult issues. As trial and
appellate courts settle how a given opinion fits within a given case, the frequency
and disparity in rulings on admissibility
should abate.
More generally, the Daubert cases deal not
solely with science or the reliability of
expertise. Rather, these cases focus on how
courts can use advances in knowledge to
satisfy the judicial imperative to decide
cases. The cases set the terms on which factfinders borrow from other disciplines. They
also require the courts to retain the discipline and pragmatic judgment acquired
while resolving previous disputes. Judicial
decision-makers must ask not only whether
new knowledge can be justified in its own
terms, but also whether, when and how
new knowledge has a role to play in
advancing the just and expedient resolution
of conflict. ■
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Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993)

2

Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. App. 1923)
("Sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance
in the particular field in which it belongs.")
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